Taxes, Inequality and the Size of the Informal Sector by Dessy, Sylvain & Pallage, Stéphane
Taxes, Inequality and the Size of the Informal Sector




In this note we develop a simple heterogeneous-agent model with incomplete markets to explain the
prevalence of a large, low-productivity, informal sector in developing countries. In our model, taxes
levied on formal sector agents are used to ﬁnance the provision of a productive public infrastructure,
which creates a productivity premium from formalization. Our model offers endogenous differentiation
of rich and poor countries. Complete formalization is an equilibrium only in countries with the appro-
priate initial conditions. We discuss existence of this equilibrium and highlight the ambiguous effect of
taxes.
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1 Introduction
Dualism in the organization of production activities is very pervasive in developing countries, with informal,
low-productivity methods of production coexisting with higher-productivity, formal methods. While 17% of
the work force in OECD countries operates in the informal sector, this ﬁgure, in developing countries, rises
to 60% (Ihrig and Moe, 2000). In this note, we ask why such a signiﬁcant proportion of the economy-wide
resources remains trapped in the low-productivity, informal sector. We address the issue of policy responses
towards informal organization of production and emphasize the ambiguous effect of taxation.
We do so within a heterogeneous-agent model in which the existence of strategic complementarities
generates multiple, Pareto-ranked, equilibrium formal sector sizes. Our model has four main assumptions:
(i) the provision of public infrastructure creates a productivity premium from formalization. Formalizing
production does not just mean taking an old technology and making it legal, it implies switching from low-
to high-productivity technologies to take advantage of the availability of public infrastructures.1 (ii) The
productivity premium from formalization increases with infrastructure quality; (iii) this quality depends on
the level of public funds collected from the formal sector; and (iv) markets are incomplete, i.e. agents cannot
buy or sell assets in response to exogenous changes in their environment.
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1High-productivity technologies rely on mass production, which requires marketing, itself in need of infrastructures for shipping
and handling.Strategic complementarities arise in the model because the tax ﬁnancing the provision of productivity-
enhancing infrastructure is levied on formal sector agents only, which makes the productivity premium from
formalization dependent upon the formal sector size. In this context of multiple equilibria, it is well known
that banning informality is justiﬁable on efﬁciency grounds, unless an equilibrium with complete formal-
ization does not exist. Hence the importance of discussing sufﬁcient conditions for such an equilibrium to
exist. In our discussion, we emphasize the interplay between expectations and historical legacies in deter-
mining sufﬁcient conditions for an economy to beneﬁt from the enforcement of a ban on informal activities.
By combining expectations and historical legacies in this manner, our analysis bridges two strands of the
literature on the causes of under-development: a theoretical literature emphasizing coordination failures
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989) and a neo-classical literature (Saint-Paul and
Verdier, 1993; Parente and Prescott, 1994 and 1999).2 Unlike those studies in which rich and poor countries
face the same menu of equilibria, our model provides symmetry-breaking between rich and poor countries
in the sense of Matsuyama (1996).
We ﬁnd that an equilibrium with full formalization is unlikely to exist in poor countries. Moreover,
reducing the level of the tax ﬁnancing productive public infrastructure may fail to lead to the emergence of
this equilibrium. Unlike in Fortin et al. (1997) and Ihrig and Moe (2000), reducing the cost of formalization
may in fact increase the size of the informal sector. In other words, our model elicits the ambivalent role of
tax reforms as a policy instrument for eliminating informality.
2 The model
We consider a two-period economy with a single consumption good. The economy is populated by a con-
tinuum of two-period lived consumers-entrepreneurs of mass 1, each indexed by
￿
, the agent’s endowment







































. One can think of en-
dowments either as human capital (entrepreneurial ability) or physical capital. Agents maximize the present




















































the periodic utility function, which is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisﬁes Inada conditions.
In period1, onlyacottage-industry, low-productivity technologyisavailable forproducing theconsump-
tion good. It is assumed, without loss of generality, that an agent
￿
who uses this technology in absence of
public infrastructures can produce
￿
units of the good. Agents can allocate an exogenously determined
sum
/ from their ﬁrst-period production/income to contribute to the ﬁnancing of a productive infrastructure,
necessary for the adoption of a high-productivity technology. Formalization in our model is a process of
2See Krugman (1991) for a survey of these literatures. Adser` a and Ray (1998) have a model in which history favors inertia as a
coordination mechanism.
2acquiring the right to use a productive, publicly-ﬁnanced infrastructure. Once the infrastructure is built, in
period 2, those who did not contribute can nevertheless use it, but they cannot adopt the high-productivity
technology. This corresponds to a scenario where the high-productivity technology is freely distributed only
to those who paid the formalization fee. Let
0 denote the number of agents who elect to formalize. Assum-







/ .3 In period 2, therefore,





































































































































































Assumption A.1 implies that infrastructure, while productive in both technologies, is only essential for
operating the high-productivity technology. Assumption A.2 states that the availability of infrastructure
generates a productivity premium from formalization, since formalization involves the adoption of a more






￿ , agents choose whether or not to go formal by anticipating the effect of this decision on
their ﬁrst- and second-period consumptions. Denote by





























































. This restricts the value of


























denote the present-value of utility of an agent
￿




















































































































































































































The net value from formalizing depends upon the realized formal sector size,
0 , implying that there
are strategic complementarities between agents’ efforts to formalize, as this concept is used in Matsuyama





￿ , if thepercentage changein theproductivity premium
from formalization following a marginal increase in infrastructure quality is sufﬁciently high, the net value
from formalizing can be shown to be increasing in






































































3We assume away the possibility that parts of tax proceeds may be consumed by the government or swallowed up in corruption.
We chose to abstract from this aspect which has been treated by Sarte (2000), and highlight the fact that even if the whole tax






















































Because of this interdependence of agents’ decisions, each agent must form expectations about others’























￿ . He will opt for the status quo otherwise.
In accordance with the literature on strategic complementarities (e.g. Katz and Shapiro, 1985), we
assume that agents have identical expectations of formal sector size, and that, in equilibrium, agents’ expec-
tations are fulﬁlled. A fulﬁlled expectations equilibrium (FEE) is a realized formal sector size
0 such that







w ), and (ii) all agents’ decisions are optimal. The following





























































































































































































￿ , the properties of







￿ . The Implicit Function
Theorem may then be applied to establish the rest of the result.
Condition (5) states that the rate at which the productivity premium from formalization increases follow-
ing an increase in the agent’s endowment of the productive asset
￿





￿ implies that the higher the expected formal sector size, the lower the level of capital an agent must be
endowed with in order to be indifferent between formalizing or not. Given our normalization of population
size and the deﬁnition of




































￿ is continuous by assumption, Brouwer’s ﬁxed





￿ , and on the level of
/ , the ﬁxed point problem in (6) can admit multiple solutions. In the
next section, we characterize the set of equilibria and investigate policy responses to informality, including
the role of taxation.
3 Taxes, inequality, and the existence of a full formalization equilibrium
In this section, we want to emphasize three main results. First, there always exists an equilibrium with
full informalization. Second, the existence of a full formalization equilibrium crucially depends on the
4proportion of agents with endowments below the cut-off value
￿
￿
. Third, lowering taxes may have surprising
results on the size of the informal sector.





































When condition (7) is satisﬁed no agent is better off in the informal sector when he believes all other agents
will formalize. As we show below, however, this condition does not warrant uniqueness of equilibrium:











a FEE if and only if condition (7) is satisﬁed.



























true by construction. The proof of the second claim follows from (6).
Proposition 2implies that theexistenceof theequilibriumwith completeinformalization is purelydriven
by expectations, while that of the full formalization equilibrium is driven jointly by expectations and initial


































￿ ), there is a role
for the enforcement of a ban against informal activities. This ban will help coordinate decisions towards the

















population cannot afford to formalize, policies need to ﬁrst establish the conditions for existence of the full
formalization equilibrium by correcting historical legacies. We begin our discussion of history-correcting
policies by reassessing the popular issue of tax reform as an instrument for the promotion of formalization.
3.1 The ambiguous role of taxes


















































































































































. All that matters















/ is to understand how the net value from formalizing changes with
/ . In the next proposition, we establish existence of a positive threshold
/
￿
below which the proportion of
agents better off in the informal sector rises as taxes are lowered. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to
constant returns technologies with respect to infrastructures.
Proposition 3 Let
7 and
















































































































































































































































￿ otherwise. Note that when condition























































































are respectively decreasing and increasing functions of



























































































Condition (8) states that the contribution of infrastructure to production in the informal sector is high
enough that it makes free-riding on infrastructures attractive. In such case, Proposition 3 implies that re-
ducing the formalization fee can in fact increase the proportion of agents who are better off in the informal
sector, thus precluding the existence of a full formalization equilibrium. This result contradicts what is pre-
dicted from models that ignore the circularity between the quality of infrastructure and the size of the formal
sector (e.g. Fortin et al., 1997 and Ihrig and Moe, 2000). Given the ambiguous role of taxes, policies that
target the distribution of productive capital, if feasible, may be interesting alternatives to tax reforms.
3.2 The role of inequality
For a given tax
/ , condition (7) is more likely to be violated in poor countries than in rich countries. Take
two countries with asset distributions identical in all respects but their mean, with condition (7) satisﬁed in
the ﬁrst one but not in the second. Then, necessarily the second country is the one with lowest mean asset.
Of course, two countries with identical per capita asset levels may ﬁnd themselves with asymmetries in
their menus of equilibria. Then, it must be that the one for which full formalization is not an equilibrium is







































, and 0 otherwise. In Figure







































￿ satisﬁes condition (7) — all agents have endowments higher than
￿
￿
— so that a
full formalization equilibrium exists. Increasing inequality through a mean-preserving spread of
￿ , we ﬁnd
a positive number of agents better off not formalizing. The full formalization equilibrium has vanished.
The asset distribution is in fact a fundamental source of symmetry-breaking, whether by its ﬁrst or its
second moment. In absence of a massive inﬂow of assets from abroad, the second moment might be a
good target for a correcting policy. Although redistribution of physical capital, or subsidized education fall
outside of the scope of our model, these are policies that would go in the direction of reducing inequality.
In countries in which education resources are unequally distributed, for example, a condition like (7) is
4It can easily be veriﬁed that
¤
J
' is a mean-preserving spread of
¤ with variance multiplied by a factor of 8.
6Figure 1: Mean-preserving spread



































likely to be violated. In African countries, ethnic divisions are known to diverge resources away from the
education needs of the majority of the population (Easterly, 2000), thus making informal, low-productivity
activities more attractive to this majority. A policy that would help achieve complete formalization is one
that ﬁrst corrects history by improving access to quality education. Once history is corrected so that an
equilibrium with complete formalization exists, a ban on informal activities is Pareto-improving. This, of
course, is easier said than done. The correcting policy may not itself be Pareto-improving. Agents in the
upper tail of the asset distribution may prefer the status quo to a combination of the correcting policy and
the subsequent move towards full formalization. In particular, if ethnic divisions are the key determinant of
inequality, correcting policies are likely doomed to upset.
Given that much of illegal labor and child labor take place in the informal sector, our results are clearly
linked to the discussion on the desirability of bans on these types of work (Basu and Van, 1998; Dessy and
Pallage, 2001). Since most illegal labor is typically driven by poverty, if condition (7) is not satisﬁed, then
such bans, without correcting policies, will likely not be Pareto improvements.
4 Final discussion
We have worked throughout under the assumption of no-enforcement, therefore focusing on self-enforcing
equilibria. We believe this assumption is not unreasonable for countries in which 60% of the labor force
belongs to the informal sector. Banning informality in this context is a challenge to which few governments
would survive. In richer countries, in which everyone can afford to go formal, once we abstract from moral
hazard issues as we do in this paper, enforcement does not pose much difﬁculty. Our results, however, show
that bans in that case are in effect self-enforcing. The role of a ban, when it is imposed, is that of a signal
7pointing to the relevant focal point.
What this note has achieved is a “big push” theory based on a move towards formalization in a model in
which differences in the behaviors of countries’ arise endogenously. The “big push,” or the absence of it, is
not due to expectations only, but depends on the existence of an equilibrium towards which to “push.”
As for a reduction in the tax burden, its effects are ambiguous. Our results therefore suggest that caution
is needed when using such simple-minded policy, often recommended in the literature as the solution to
informalization.
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